Anticipating Pandemic Avian Influenza: Why the Federal and State Preparedness Plans Are for the Birds by Ahle, Hillary R.
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 Winter 2007: Symposium - Shaping a 
New Direction for Law and Medicine: An 
International Debate on Culture, Disaster, 
Biotechnology and Public Health 
Article 4 
October 2015 
Anticipating Pandemic Avian Influenza: Why the Federal and State 
Preparedness Plans Are for the Birds 
Hillary R. Ahle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
Hillary R. Ahle, Anticipating Pandemic Avian Influenza: Why the Federal and State Preparedness Plans Are 
for the Birds, 10 DePaul J. Health Care L. 213 (2007) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol10/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
ANTICIPATING PANDEMIC AVIAN INFLUENZA:
WHY THE FEDERAL AND STATE PREPAREDNESS PLANS
ARE FOR THE BIRDS
Hillary R. Ahle
I
The (1918 Spanish Influenza) epidemic killed, at a very, very
conservative estimate.. .550,000 Americans in ten months, that's more
Americans than died in combat in all the wars of this century... the
epidemic killed at least 30 million in the world and infected the
majority of the human species... As soon as the dying stopped, the
forgetting began.2
The pandemic clock is ticking, we just don't know what time it is. 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Remember the last time you woke up on a winter morning with a sore
throat, fever, and chills? You likely turned off your alarm, called into
work sick, crawled back under the covers, and braced yourself to
endure the obvious culprit, the flu. Influenza, or the flu, is ubiquitous
in our society and often indiscernible from the common cold.4 Many
Americans simply consider it to be an "inevitability of winter.",5 One
commentator has even dubbed the flu a "cuddly disease" that keeps its
' DePaul University College of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2007; University of
Wisconsin - Madison, B.S., 2004. The author wishes to thank her parents for their
support and encouragement, as well as the DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE
LAW's Editorial Board for their editorial efforts and suggestions.
2 Influenza 1918, The American Experience [hereinafter "Influenza 1918"], PBS
transcript, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/influenza/filmmore/transcript/transcript 1 .html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2006) (quoting Alfred W. Crosby).
3 Pandemic Influenza Overview, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, at
http://www.hhs.govlbloodsafety/presentation/Schwartz.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006)
(quoting Ed Marcuse, a former Chairman of the National Vaccine Advisory
Committee).
4 Mike Doming, Bird Flu Risk Hinges on Computation, Mutation, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Nov. 1, 2005, at Cl. See generally JAMES E. CHIN, CONTROL OF
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES MANUAL, (17th ed., American Public Health
Association) (2000) (suggesting that it may be impossible to differentiate flu
symptoms from that of other respiratory diseases without a lab test).
5 Id.
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victims "curled up in bed on winter mornings instead of heading off to
work.",6 But in reality, the flu is anything but cuddly.
7
The flu is an acute respiratory infection caused by a variety of
influenza viruses. 8 Every year during flu season, ten to fifteen percent
of the U.S. population is infected with the flu, 9 and on average, 36,000
Americans die from the flu or its complications.10 Most flu fatalities,
such as those of infants, the elderly, and people diagnosed with AIDS,
result from weakened iru-nune systems and, ultimately, viral or
bacterial pneumonia complications.
6 Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb, 91 ABA JOURNAL 36, 38 (2005) (quoting
Thomas Abraham, author of Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS).
7 Influenza 1918, supra note 1. Dr. Alfred Crosby, author of America's Forgotten
Pandemic has said, "One of the factors that made [the 1918 flu] so particularly
frightening was that everybody had a preconception of what the flu was: it's a
miserable cold and, after a few days, you're up and around, this was a flu that put
people into bed as if they'd been hit with a 2 x 4. That turned into pneumonia that
turned people blue and black and killed them. It was a flu out of some sort of a horror
story. They never had dreamed that influenza could ever do anything like this to
people before." Id.
8 Flu Fact Sheet, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGIES AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE
OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, December 1997, at
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/flu.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2005). Flu viruses
are spread from person-to-person by coughing and sneezing and they enter the body
through the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, or mouth. Id. Symptoms of the flu
are recognizable to most people and typically last anywhere from twenty-four hours
to seven days or longer. Chin J, ed., supra note 4. Symptoms may include fever,
headache, sore throat, cough, muscle aches, and fatigue. Id. These yearly flu
outbreaks are known as epidemics and can be attributed to three virus types, influenza
A, B, and C. The Influenza A virus causes regional and widespread epidemics and
affects animals and humans alike, while milder illness and minor outbreaks are
attributed to influenza types B and C. Because both virus types A and B go through
constant but relatively slight mutations, known as antigenic drift, it is difficult to
control the illness from one flu season to the next. Nature's Terrorist Attack:
Pandemic Influenza, Preparedness Planning for State Health Officials, THE
ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, at
http://www.astho.org/pubs/PandemicInfluenza.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter "Nature's Terrorist Attack"]. Additionally, flu viruses are constructed of
Ribonucleic acid. This is significant because when an RNA virus replicates itself
from inside a human cell, its copying mechanism makes numerous small errors in
genetic translation. These slight errors, or mutations, are the reason that last year's
vaccines do not protect against this year's flu strains. Doming, supra note 4.
9 Nature's Terrorist Attack, supra note 8.
'0 Doming, supra note 4.
11 Id.
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America's casual perception of the flu may stem from many
Americans having never experienced a full-blown flu pandemic. The
yearly flu season is an epidemic flu; epidemic flus are caused by strains
of flu virus that are already circulating in the human population.,
3
People build up immunity against epidemic flu, either by having had
prior contact with a specific virus or through vaccination. A
pandemic flu, however, is a global outbreak caused by new strains of
the flu virus and, as such, no immunity exists in the population and
everyone is highly susceptible to falling seriously ill. 15  A vaccine
cannot be made until the virus has emerged in the population. . . when
it is already too late for prevention.' 
6
12 What Is An Influenza Pandemic?, CDC, at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general
(last visited Feb. 17, 2006). "An influenza pandemic is a global outbreak of disease
that occurs when a new influenza A virus appears or 'emerges' in the human
population, causes serious illness in people, and then spreads easily from person-to-
person, causes serious illness, and can sweep across the country and around the world
in very short time." Id.
13 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL[hereinafter "CDC"], at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
14 PandemicFlu.gov, How Does Seasonal Flu Differ From Pandemic Flu, at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/season-or-pandemic.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2006);
The World Health Organization (WHO) has implemented surveillance around the
world since 1947 to detect prevalent and emerging strains of flu, and this information
is used annually in producing a flu vaccine. AW Hampson, Surveillance for
Pandemic Influenza, 176 J. INF. Dis. S8-13 (1997).
15 Daniel DeNoon, Avian Influenza and Pandemic Influenza in Historical Perspective,
WEB MD, Nov. 2, 2005, at http://www.webmd.com/content/Article/l14/111343.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006). Because type A viruses can infect both animals and
humans, there is a possibility that a new A virus will develop, either through mutation
or the mixing of different viruses from different species. The Pandemic Influenza
Threat [hereinafter "HHS Plan"], HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemiclnfluenzaPlan.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006). A flu pandemic is triggered when a novel influenza A virus
emerges in humans through recombination, or major change in the virus's
composition, of human and animal antigens (swine or avian) causing serious illness,
and then has sustained global transmission from person-to-person. Nature's Terrorist
Attack, supra note 8; see also CDC, supra note 13. Pigs are a common reservoir for
emerging viruses because they can be infected by both human flu and bird flu, and
avian viruses have played a role in the last three influenza pandemics.
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza [hereinafter "National Strategy"],
Homeland Security Council, Nov. 2005, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/pandemic-influenza.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2006). Not all virus mutations will lead to a pandemic, but the more times
recombination occurs, the more likely the necessary mutations will occur to cause
sustained human-to-human transmission. Nature's Terrorist Attack, supra note 8.
16 CDC, supra note 12.
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Consequently, pandemic flus are appreciably more deadly than
epidemic flus and are cause for great concern.17 While it is nearly
impossible to predict which strain of flu virus will cause a pandemic,
experts say pandemics are inevitable and the modern world is
overdue.18  In the last three hundred years there have been ten flu
pandemics. 19 There were three flu pandemics in the twentieth century,
in 1918, 1957, and 1968, which killed approximately forty million, two
million and one million people worldwide, respectively. 20 Dr. Michael
T. Osterholm, Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research
and Policy at the University of Minnesota, has said, "Pandemic flus are
like earthquakes and hurricanes. . . [t]hey're the one area in public
health you can predict.'
Since late summer 2005, the deadly H5N1 22 strain of avian flu
has garnered increasing public interest due to the large number of
poultry the disease has ravaged and its high fatality rate in humans.
23
The H5N1 virus has killed more than fifty percent of its human
victims. 24  Presently, the H5N1 avian flu has not reached pandemic
status because there has not been any sustained human-to-human
transmission of the virus; it is currently spread to humans solely
through direct contact with infected birds, although, in a few instances,
human-to-human transmission is suspected.25  In October 2005,
scientists made the chilling announcement they had decoded the deadly
17 DeNoon, supra note 15.
18 Denise Grady, Danger of Flu Pandemic is Clear, If Not Present, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2005, at Section 1 ("The timing of the bird flu's emergence also makes scientists
nervous, because many believe that based on history, the world is overdue for a
pandemic...'In the 20th century there were three pandemics which means an average
of one every 30 years.. .The last one was in 1968, so it's 37 years. Just on the basis of
evolution, of how things go, we're overdue"').
19Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Hitting the Flu at Its Source, Before it Hits Us, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2005, at Week in Review.
20 World Health Agency Tones Down Alarm on Possible Flu Pandemic [hereinafter
"WHO Tones Down"], N.Y. TIlMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at A5.
21 McNeil, supra note 19.
22 DeNoon, supra note 15. "Type A flu viruses are subtyped according to proteins on
their surfaces. There are 16 different H proteins and nine different N proteins. All H
and N proteins occur in birds. Human disease has traditionally been caused by three
H subtypes - HI, H2, and H3. Recently, humans have become ill after catching new
H subtypes - H5, H7, and H9 - from birds. It's feared that one of these subtypes will
emerge as the next flu pandemic - particularly the H5N1 virus causing an
unprecedented global epidemic among domestic and wild birds." Id.
23 CDC, supra note 12.
24 Doming, supra note 4.
25 WHO Tones Down, supra note 20; HHS plan, supra note 15, at S5-27.
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1918 strain of flu which had triggered a pandemic that infected half of
26the earth's population. It, too, was an avian flu strain that was able to
directly infect humans.27 Experts were unnerved by this discovery; the
genetic changes that allowed the 1918 strain to infect humans directly
are beginning to appear in the H5N1 avian flu strain.
28
In the wake of the disastrous federal and state emergency
response to Hurricane Katrina in late 2005, the possibility that the
H5N1 avian flu virus will mutate to enable sustained human-to-human
transmission has left many Americans doubting the government's
ability to handle a flu pandemic, and rightly so. Irwin Redlener,
Director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia
University, has called the recent flurry of interest in a flu pandemic the
"post-Katrina effect. '' 29  In an interview prior to the government's
release of its pandemic plans, Democratic Senator Tom Harkin said,
"'Trust us' is not something the administration can say after Katrina...
We want plans. We want specific goals and procedures we're going to
take to prepare for this."
30
And so the United States prepared. The federal government
published a national pandemic plan in November 2005, but public
health experts worry the plan is not comprehensive enough to prepare
Americans for the inevitable. 31 Dr. David Nabarro, the United Nations
26 Bird Flu and the 1918 Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at A14.
27 Id. "The worrisome news is that the 1918 virus appears to have jumped directly
from birds to humans, and that the genetic changes that allowed it to do so are already
beginning to appear in the avian strain, known as H5N1, which has killed large
numbers of birds and about 60 people in four Asian countries. The two most recent
global pandemics, in 1957 and 1968, were caused by human flu virus that picked up
some bird flu components. Now it turns out that the far more lethal 1918 virus, which
killed perhaps 20 to 100 million people, was most likely an avian strain that jumped
directly into humans. That gives today's avian strain two routes to wreak havoc
among humans.. .Two top federal health officials said that the H5N1 virus has already
acquired five of the 10 genetic sequence changes associated with human-to-human
transmission of the 1918 virus." Id.
28 id.
29 Gardiner Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington, N.Y. TIMES, October 5,
2005, at A23.
30 Id.
31 See National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the HHS Pandemic Influenza
Plan: Thoughts and Comments from the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC [hereinafter
"UPMC"], UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER: CENTER FOR
BIOSECURITY, Nov. 7, 2005, at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/avianflu/comments-
fluplan.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (suggesting additional preparation is still
necessary to properly prepare for a pandemic); see also McNeil, supra note 19 (Dr.
Michael T. Osterholm comparing America to "the guy going to his 25h high school
20071
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coordinator for pandemic flu, has said the government will not be ready
to combat pandemic flu until it has "vaccination, quarantine, and
treatment plans written and stockpiles in place," and has "run repeated
simulation exercises involving doctors, police officers, utility workers,"
and other relevant responders. 32 While all of these requirements have
been given lip service in the federal government's pandemic plan, it
remains to be seen whether the state authorities, health care responders,
and the American public will be able to put the plan effectively into
action to combat a flu pandemic.
This Article aims to apply lessons learned in prior public health
emergencies to the current pandemic plans of both the federal
government and state of Illinois. The Article will highlight necessary
supplemental actions the government on both levels must still address
prior to a pandemic emergency. Part I relays the gravity of a flu
pandemic and background of the H5N1 virus. This section also
identifies the weaknesses of government response to each recent public
health crisis from the Anthrax attacks of 2001 to Hurricane Katrina,
namely communication, distribution, organization, and the lack of
clearly specified roles. Part II outlines and evaluates both the federal
and state of Illinois plans in terms of their preparedness and
communication; surveillance and detection; and response and
containment initiatives. Part II concludes that the federal government
has delegated excess responsibility to the individual states and that a
more standardized delegation is necessary. Finally, Part III focuses on
the largely-ignored role of the American health care system in
pandemic response efforts. While the health care system's role will be
considerable, it has been left with an enormous unfunded mandate that
requires both increased specificity and standardization. Four aspects of
the health care system require further attention: enhancing the health
care workforce, stockpiling medical supplies, appropriating sufficient
funds, and creating public awareness of the ethical decisions that health
care workers may be faced with during a pandemic. As Dr. Osterholm
acknowledged, "If Katrina taught us nothing else, it's not enough to
have [a plan] on paper. ' 33
reunion who decides the night before that he needs to lose 50 pounds," and concludes
the best he can do is "get a new suit and a shoeshine").
32 McNeil, supra note 19.
33 Michael Osterholm, M.D., Pandemic Influenza; A Harbinger of Things to Come,
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, Sept. 19, 2005, at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic-id= 1413&fuseaction=topics.event_sum
mary&eventid=142787# (last visited Sept. 23, 2006).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Public Health Threat: H5N1 Avian Flu Virus
H5N1 emerged as a virus when a bird flu virus and a human flu virus
swapped genes inside an animal or a person that was infected by both
viruses at the same time. 34 The first human cases of H5N1 avian flu
were reported in Hong Kong in 1997 during an outbreak of avian flu in
Chinese poultry. 35 The virus spread and infected wild birds throughout
Asia and Europe during late 2003 and early 2004; more than 100
million birds in the affected countries either died from the disease or
were killed to control the outbreak.36 By March 2004, the outbreak was
reportedly under control. Beginning in June 2004, however, fresh
outbreaks in poultry occurred in several Asian countries.37 These
outbreaks are ongoing and the virus has been found in more than fifty
countries to date.
8
Today, human infection by H5N1 has been reported in
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Turkey, and most
recently in Iraq.39  Current statistics show 258 people have been
34 Doming, supra note 4.
35 Id.
36 CDC, supra note 12.
37 Id. China has recently completed a campaign to vaccinate all of the country's 5.2
billion domesticated birds in order to contain the spread of the virus and prevent
further possibility of mutations in humans. Since October 2005, 151,000 chickens,
ducks and geese have died and 22 million more birds have been destroyed in China.
See China Reports 6th Human Case of Bird Flu [hereinafter "China Reports"], N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A9. Diderik De Vleeschauwer, the U.N Food and
Agriculture Organization's Bangkok spokesman, says eradication of avian flu in birds
is already impossible, however, because the disease has become endemic in Southeast
Asian bird populations. Keith Bradsher, The Front Lines in the Battle Against Avian
Flu Are Running Short of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at Section 1.
38 Michael 0. Leavitt, Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic Planning
Update II, at 2, June 29, 2006, available at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/pdf/PanfluReport2.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2006);
CDC, supra note 11. In January 2006, the Agricultural Minister of Turkey, Mehdi
Eker, alleged that countries neighboring Turkey were also experiencing poultry
outbreaks of H5N1 but were covering it up and hampering global efforts to contain
the virus. "The presence of the disease in several other countries - our neighbors
governed by closed regimes - is known unofficially but those countries do not declare
it openly." Ana Sayfa, Turkey Claims Neighbors Cover up Bird Flu, HURRIYET, Jan.
16, 2006, at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/3823765.asp?gid=74 (last visited Jan
22, 2005).
39 Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) Fact Sheet, World Health
Organization (WHO), at
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confirmed as infected with H5N1, and 154 people have died.4 ° When
avian flu infects birds, it concentrates in the digestive track.4' In
humans, however, the virus attacks cells in the airways and lungs.42
Avian flu symptoms exhibited by humans have ranged from typical flu
symptoms to eye infections, pneumonia, acute respiratory distress, viral
pneumonia, and other life-threatening complications.43 An article in
the Houston Chronicle provides a horrifying description of the disease
process:
A cell inside the lungs is doomed as soon as the virus
invades it. . .it basically bursts, releasing vast numbers of
new virus particles to invade other cells. . .[and] the
immune system goes into a kind of biochemical panic
[flooding] the lungs with other disease fighting substances.
The patient suffocates on his own immune system
chemistry.4 4
Considering the uncertainty surrounding whether the H5N1
avian flu will in fact develop into a dreaded pandemic, some might
question why it has dominated the recent headlines. There are,
nonetheless, very good reasons for the attention.45 The foremost cause
for concern is that the H5N1 avian flu has an approximately fifty
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avianinfluenza/en/index.html#current
(last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
40 For up-to-date numbers see Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of
Avian Influenza A/ (H5N1) Reported to WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
(WHO), at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/en/ (last visited Nov. 29,
2006). Out of the twenty-one confirmed human cases of avian flu in Turkey, all but
two involved children aged four to eighteen, as children appear to be particularly
susceptible to the H5N1 strain "...if only because [children] are more likely to touch
or play with diseased birds or contaminated droppings." William J. Kole, "Keep Your
Children Away:" Bird Flu Most Common in Kids, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Jan. 18,
2006, at News 42.
41 Jeff Nesmith, Avian Flu Ambushes the Body, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 23, 2005,
at A9, available at
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2005_3914103 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2006).
42 Id.
43 CDC, supra note 12.
"Nesmith, supra note 41.
45 See Pandemic Influenza Overview, supra note 2. For an argument that H5N1 avian
flu is overhyped see generally Andrew Weil, M.D., Is Bird Flu Overhyped?, 167
TIME 68 (January 2006).
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46percent fatality rate. In comparison to the most destructive flu
pandemic yet, the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918 (which killed an
estimated forty million people worldwide but only two percent of its
victims), a fifty percent fatality rate is highly disturbing. 47 Further, a
pandemic in 2007 would wreak much more havoc than any prior
pandemic due to the globalized nature of modem society.48  Global
travel and commerce are far more commonplace than ever before; one
need not look further than the 2003 SARS outbreak to see how fast a
disease can spread via international travel. 49  Additionally, the
increasing population density may make containing the disease
difficult. 50 Moreover, the aging baby boom generation and explosion
of the HIV/AIDS virus provide an ample supply of potential victims in
the elderly and immunosuppressed populations.51 Similarly, there are
more daycare and nursing homes today, and these concentrations of
susceptible people could facilitate the spread of disease.52
In planning for a possible H5N1 avian flu pandemic, the U.S.
government has projected a worst-case scenario in which thirty percent
of the U.S. population will become ill, millions of people will require
hospitalization, and nearly two million Americans will lose their
lives. 53 Assuming no interventions, the direct and indirect health costs
46 EPR, at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/en/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2006). Choo, supra note 6, at 38.
47 Choo, supra note 6, at 38.
48 See id. at 40. "The economic effects of a pandemic could be devastating, says
Laurie Garrett, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations in
New York City.. .The airlines and travel industry would feel the hit first, predicts
Garrett... She says that international trade might then dry up as frantic governments
try to shut down their borders to prevent spread of the disease. Essential imported
goods, such as raw materials, medicines and certain foods, would become suddenly
unavailable. As the pandemic progresses... '[p]arents will stop coming in to work to
stay home and take care of their children' Garrett says. 'Business will grind to a halt
all over the place. What if supermarkets stop being stocked? What if you can't get
milk?"' Id.
49 See Choo, supra note 6, at 39. "In 2003, the world got a hint of how a localized
disease outbreak could spread into a pandemic. That year, severe acute respiratory
syndrome.. .emerged in southern China. Within days, the virus was carried by
international air travelers from a hotel in Hong Kong to Singapore and Hanoi, and as
far as Toronto. Within months, the disease had infected more than 8,000 people in 29
countries..." Id.
50 See, e.g., Nature's Terrorist Attack, supra note 8.
5 Doming, supra note 4.
52 See, e.g., Pandemic Influenza Overview, supra note 3.
53 Table 1: Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death
Associated with Moderate and Severe Influenza Scenarios, HEALTH AND HUMAN
2007]
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of a moderately virulent flu pandemic are expected to approach $181
billion.54 From these statistics alone, there are very good reasons for
the H5N1 hype. Regardless of whether H5N1 develops into a
pandemic flu, some virus will eventually cause a pandemic. The U.S.
government must have the foresight to properly plan and prepare for it.
B. Lessons Learned From Other Health Crises and Crisis
Exercises
Even though the majority of the American public has never
experienced the likes of a modern pandemic, a wealth of knowledge
exists in the public health crises Americans have faced in the new
millennium. By objectively scrutinizing the country's response efforts
to Hurricane Katrina, the 2003 Canadian SARS scare, and the 2001
anthrax attacks, in conjunction with the 2001 Smallpox tabletop
exercise, the government may pinpoint weaknesses that must be
immediately addressed. These lessons must instruct the federal
government's preparation for a flu pandemic.
1. Hurricane Katrina 2005
The best illustration of bureaucratic inefficiencies in times of
catastrophe can be found in the response efforts of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") after Hurricane Katrina
devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast in August 2005. FEMA's emergency
response was gradual at best. Problems included failed
communications between local, state, and federal authorities, 55 delayed
emergency response of firefighters in order to give them sexual-
harassment training,56 and supply distribution complications.57 Aaron
Broussard, Louisiana's Jefferson Parish president, commented on
FEMA's incompetence, "It's not just Katrina that caused all these
SERVICES (HHS) PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
54 Id. at 16.
55 Choo, supra note 6, at 39.
56 Walter Williams, Opinion: Disasters Expose Inefficiencies of Government,
DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006, at A12.
57 Transcript of Interview with Aaron Broussard, Meet the Press, Sept. 4, 2005, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9179790/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) ("We had Wal-
Mart deliver three trucks of water, trailer trucks of water. FEMA turned them back.
They said we didn't need them").
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deaths in New Orleans here. Bureaucracy has committed murder here.
.958
Wal-Mart's response efforts stood in stark contrast to FEMA's
response. Prior to the storm making landfall, Wal-Mart had trailer-
trucks full of water and supplies shipped to the area, while FEMA
officials were just arriving. In light of Wal-Mart's life-saving
preparation and response efforts, some Louisiana officials remarked
that Wal-Mart would have done a better job at emergency response
than FEMA. Others assert that Wal-Mart was able to respond
successfully in that emergency specifically because it was not a
government agency.
60
2. SARS 2003
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS") emerged in southern
China in 2003.61 SARS was carried by oblivious airline passengers
from Hong Kong to Singapore and Hanoi and then Toronto within
days.62  It infected eight thousand people in twenty-nine countries
within months, causing approximately eight hundred deaths.
63
Fortunately, SARS was not very contagious, unlike most influenza
viruses. 64 Only a few people referred to as "superspreaders" 65 could
transmit the disease.
When SARS surfaced in Toronto, the Canadian public health
system sprung into action. The infected patients were isolated, patient
contacts were quarantined, the affected hospitals turned away non-
SARS-related patients, and strict contagion control was implemented
region-wide. 66 But the Canadians' efforts to curb the outbreak were not
58 Id.
59 Sheldon Richman, Hurricane Katrina: Government Versus the Private Sector, THE
FREEMAN, October 2005, available at http://www.fee.org/pdf/the-
freeman/1005Perspective.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
60 Id.
61 Choo, supra note 6, at 39.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 id.
65 A superspreader is a person that was able to easily spread the SARS disease to
others. Id
66 Choo, supra note 6, at 39. See also Lawrence K. Altman, M.D., The Doctor's
World; Behind the Mask, The Fear of SARS, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at F1
("Toronto imposed two types of quarantines - one that confined people to their home,
the other that allowed some hospital staff members to commute in their own cars from
20071
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seamless. Canadian hospital administrators were surprised when
suppliers and hospital support staff refused to provide services or
deliver supplies to the hospitals because they were afraid to put their
67own lives in danger. As with any disease outbreak, some health care
providers were more willing to care for those infected with SARS than
others. 68  One hospital reported that "[s]ome doctors declined to
examine patients suspected of SARS.",69  For example, "[o]ne
radiologist in Toronto isolated himself in his office and interpreted x-
ray films only if they were slipped under the closed door., 70 Canadian
infectious disease specialists appealed to American doctors for
assistance when half of the Canadian medical staff was quarantined and
others were forced to work overtime.
71
One of the American doctors who traveled to Canada to provide
relief, Dr. Trish M. Perl, the chief hospital epidemiologist at Johns
Hopkins University in 2003, found that Canada was "generally better
prepared than the United States to deal with the mental health problems
of health workers in a prolonged outbreak. .. , She was also
impressed with the sharing of case information between public health
officials and clinicians. After her experience, she suggested the U.S.
adopt a system "in which an experienced doctor who understands the
daily workings of hospitals act as the leader in communicating to the
public" in the case of a pandemic.73
home to work but nowhere else, including grocery stores. So the hospital had to set
up a grocery store for them in its cafeteria").
67 Choo, supra note 6, at 39 ("One of the challenges in crafting effective preparedness
plans is to envision as many scenarios as possible, says Steven D. Gravely, a health
care practice lawyer at Troutman Sanders in Richmond, Va ... The key, he says, is to
identify the potential surprises... 'Imagine you're a hospital being called on to surge -
to rapidly expand capacity - and you need to beef up your infrastructure, but your
suppliers refuse to deliver because they're afraid of being infected,' Gravely says. 'In
retrospect, it was kind of like a 'duh,' but it was surprising at the time"').
68 Altman, supra note 66 (Some doctors would move to the other side of the room
when a colleague that had cared for a SARS patient was present. Some doctors
"collapsed in the SARS outbreak because they were worried about becoming infected
or infecting their families").
69 Id.
70 Altman, supra note 66.
71 Id.
72 id.
73 id.
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3. Anthrax 2001
Anthrax, an infectious agent, was mailed to various American
politicians in the fall of 2001. 74 Twenty-two people became ill with the
disease. 5 Eleven people contracted the most lethal form, inhalation
anthrax, and of those eleven, five people died.76 The remaining eleven
people suffered from cutaneous anthrax, which primarily affects the
skin.77
The most important information to be gleaned from the high-
profile anthrax experience is the necessity of clear and effective
communication. During the anthrax attacks, the American public
criticized health officials for communicating to the public in a
"confusing and inadequate" manner.78 A study conducted by the
RAND Corporation to evaluate the lessons learned in the anthrax
attacks was published in the American Journal of Public Health in
March 2005.79 Generally, the study's focus groups characterized the
Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") and the District of Columbia
health department as providing "very little useful information," "an
absence of information," and "poor quality of information., 80 The lead
author of the RAND report, Janice Blanchard, said the study's findings
"underscore the need to develop better ways [to] deliver direct,
consistent and accurate information to different groups during a health
care emergency.
'
"
81
4. Smallpox Tabletop Exercise 2001 - Dark Winter
Dark Winter was a simulated terrorist attack conducted in June 2001 by
the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies in order to
explore the challenges following a hypothetical release of the smallpox
14 Randy Dotinga, Anthrax Attacks Left a Lingering Mistrust, HEALTH DAY, Feb. 24,
2005.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Altman, supra note 66.
79 Amy Keller, ROLL CALL, Mar. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.rand.org/news/press.05/02.22.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006). The study
was commissioned to aid federal authorities in dealing with public health emergencies
and involved focus groups with thirty-six postal workers from the affected mail-
sorting facility and several Senate staffers. Id.
80 Id.
81 id.
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virus into a community within the United States.82  Participants
included twelve high-level government or military employees who
portrayed members of the National Security Council ("NSC"), five
news journalists who participated in mock news briefs, and
approximately fifty people familiar with biological warfare.
83
Several worrisome trends emerged in the simulation that are
likely to present in an actual pandemic flu outbreak. First, the exercise
participants quickly learned it was impossible to make decisions
without the data and expertise of people in the medical and public
health sectors. 84 Unfortunately, few systems existed that could provide
"a rapid flow of the medical and public health information needed in a
public health emergency" of this magnitude. 85  Second, vaccine
shortages in the simulation significantly constrained attempts to control
the epidemic, as well as the ability of political leaders to reassure the
American people, and led to intense public anxiety for the people who
86
could not get vaccinated. Third, the health care system was
overwhelmed because it already operated near capacity and lacked the
ability to "surge' '87 in order to deal with mass casualties. 88 Finally,
82 See Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense et al., Dark Winter 43 (June 22-
23, 2001) [hereinafter "Dark Winter"], available at http://www.hopkins-
biodefense.org/DARK%20WINTER.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
83 id.
84 Tara O'Toole, et al., Shining Light on "Dark Winter," 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 972-983, 981 (2002), available at
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/joumal/issues/v34n7/020165/020165.web.pdf
?erFrom=-7079282228424833896Guest (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
85 Id. During the exercise the Governor of Oklahoma, Frank Keating, said, "We can't
ration....Who do you choose and who do you not choose to get vaccinated? ...People
are going to go where the vaccine is. And if they know that you're going to provide
the vaccine to my people, they'll stay to get vaccinated. I think they'll run if they think
the vaccine is somewhere else." Id.
86 Id.
87 Surge capacity is a health care system's ability to rapidly expand beyond normal
services to meet the increased demand for qualified personnel, medical care, and
public health in the event of bioterrorism or other large-scale public health
emergencies or disasters. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, at
http://www.hsrnet.net/ahrq/surgecapacity/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
88 O'Toole, supra note 84, at 982. In Dark Winter, "[tihe numbers of people flooding
into hospitals across the country included people with common illnesses who feared
they had smallpox and people who were well but worried. The challenges of
distinguishing the sick from the well and rationing scarce resources, combined with
shortages of health care staff, who were themselves worried about becoming infected
or bringing infection home to their families, imposed a huge burden on the health care
system." Id.
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tensions mounted between state and federal authorities in Dark Winter
because of unclear, unsettled, or conflicting protocol and roles.
89
III. THE FEDERAL PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN AND THE
ILLINOIS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE PLAN
Amid ongoing international and domestic debate regarding the H5N1
virus, the U.S. federal government finally unveiled its own pandemic
flu plan in November 2005. The plan divides preparedness and
response functions between federal, state, and local governments, with
the bulk of the responsibility landing on the individual states. Within
the federal plan, roles to be played by state and local governments are
identified, but not developed, and the states are left to formulate and
fund individualized plans.
While this division of labor reflects the constitutional
division of governmental responsibility for public health
(which places the authority for protecting the public's health
with the states), most state and local public health agencies
lack the people, money, and political clout to manage an
epidemic. State and local leaders will quickly recognize
that they have just been assigned responsibility for a huge
unfunded mandate.9
0
The federal plan consists of two documents, The National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the HHS Pandemic Influenza
Plan. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza is a twelve-page
overview of the government's plan, which President Bush revealed
during his speech at the National Institutes for Health on November 1,
89 Id. "State leaders wanted control of decisions regarding the imposition of disease-
containment measures (e.g., mandatory vs. voluntary isolation and vaccination), the
closure of state borders to all traffic and transportation, and when or whether to close
airports. Federal officials argued that such issues were best decided on a national
basis to ensure consistency and to give the President maximum control of military and
public-safety assets. Leaders in states most affected by smallpox wanted immediate
access to smallpox vaccine for all citizens of their states, but the federal government
had to balance these requests against military and other national priorities. State
leaders were opposed to federalizing the National Guard, which they were relying on
to support logistical and public supply needs. A number of federal leaders argued that
the National Guard should be federalized." Id.
90 UPMC, supra note 31, at 1.
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2005. 9' During his speech, President Bush stressed the importance of
virus detection, vaccine development, and federal, state, and local
involvement in the response efforts.92
Most experts expected the highly-anticipated HHS Pandemic
Influenza Plan ("federal plan") 93 to "describe the priorities, roles and
responsibilities, and operational details of the actual implementation of
the national strategy in states, cities, towns, and hospitals across the
nation." 94 In actuality, the lengthy plan merely advises the states of
considerations and problems that might emerge in a flu pandemic, but it
does not effectively engage the states by mandating standard and
specific roles states must fill.95 The federal government has reserved
for itself, among other duties, primary responsibility for vaccine
research, development, and capacity, as well as responsibility for
managing national and international surveillance activities, and creating
a national information database on the internet.
96
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center's Center for
Biosecurity ("UPMC") has criticized the federal plan for troubling gaps
the UPMC says will hinder the plan's effectiveness. For example, the
UPMC points to the plan's uncertain vaccine development and supply,
unanswered questions about the availability and efficacy of antiviral
medicines, unspecified response actions to be taken by individual states
and local governments, unfunded hospital responsibilities, and "false
hopes of disease containment.,
97
Then, in May 2006, the federal government published the
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
("implementation plan") in an attempt to fill the gaps left by the
existing federal plan.98 The implementation plan identifies more than
91 Bush Outlines Anti-Pandemic Strategy [hereinafter "Bush Outlines"], THE WHITE
HOUSE BULLETIN, Nov. 1, 2005.
92 id.
93 HHS plan, supra note 15.
94 UPMC, supra note 31, at 1.
95 Id. The federal government is expected to begin reviewing state readiness plans
around January 2007, and the first official assessment of state readiness should be
available in spring 2007. Lauran Neergaard, State Pandemic Preparations Vary
Widely, AP News, Dec. 17, 2006, at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061217/ap-on-he-me/pandemicreadiness (last visited
Dec. 17, 2006). The responses outlined by the states will be key in assisting less-
prepared neighboring states copy best practices. Id.
96 See HHS plan, supra note 15, at 23-25.
97 See UPMC, supra note 31.
98 HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006) [hereinafter "Implementation Plan"], available at
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three hundred specific actions to be taken by the federal government, as
well as timelines for their completion and "performance metrics."
99
Nevertheless, slow vaccine creation, lack of funding, and insufficient
emphasis on the health care system detract from the implementation
plan's potential effectiveness.100  Notable provisions affecting the
health care system include an initiative to improve the credentialing of
health care volunteers "through the Emergency System for Advance
Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals Plan (ESAR-VHP)" and
a proposed "[twenty percent] expansion of the Medical Reserve Corp
(MRC)" within the upcoming twelve months.' 01
In analyzing these and other health care-focused additions, the
UPMC has stated that it would be "helpful if HHS worked to improve
the overall organization of the federal government's medical and
nonmedical volunteer programs and to clarify how... [these] disaster-
related federal programs will work together in planning for and
responding to a health crisis."' 1 2  Because many of the criticisms
discussed in this Article remain unheeded by the federal government's
implementation plan, this Article remains focused on the weaknesses of
the federal plan.
Locally, the Illinois Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response Plan ("Illinois plan") was created by the Illinois Department
of Public Health ("IDPH") and last revised in March 2006 "to provide a
framework for Federal, State and local public health and medical
officials to work together to reduce the influenza-morbidity, mortality,
and social disruption which would result from a pandemic influenza
outbreak."' 1 3 At its most basic level, the Illinois plan breaks down
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi-implementation.pdf (last visited Sept. 2,
2006).
99 Comments from the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC on the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan [hereinafter "UPMC Comments"], 4
BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 320-24, 320 (2006), available at
http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1O891bsp.2006.4.320?cookieSet=l (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006).
'00 See id.
1o' See Implementation Plan, supra note 98, at 117-18.
102 UPMC Comments, supra note 99, at 322.
103 See ILL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH , PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE PLAN 14 (2006) [hereinafter "IDPH plan"], available at
http://www.idph.state.il.us/flu/Pandemic Flu Plan 3 17 06.pdf (last Feb. 20, 2006);
see also PandemicFlu.gov, State Pandemic Plans,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/stateplans.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (This
website provides links to pandemic plans that are currently available on state web
sites).
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responsibilities between the Governor's office, which will develop the
communication strategy and exercise general oversight; the Illinois
Department of Public Health ("IDPH"), which will be responsible for
preparedness activities; and the Illinois Emergency Management
Agency ("IEMA"), which has the task of managing the state's response
and recovery efforts. 0 4  The Illinois plan also lists many support
agencies as key players, including, but not limited to, the Illinois
Department of Transportation, the Illinois Department of Corrections,
the Illinois Department of Human Services, the Illinois Department of
Military Affairs, the Illinois Department of Central Management
Services, and the Illinois Office of the Attorney General. 105
In December 2005, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was
awarded more than $13 million in federal grant money to advance the
progress of Illinois' hospitals and health organizations in preparation
for a pandemic or bioterrorist event. 10 6  This federal grant was
conditioned upon the state's creation and maintenance of an emergency
response plan for its communities. Some of the grant's requirements
included "conducting drills and exercises to test response plans and
surge plans," holding POD10 8 hospitals accountable for "developing a
surge plan for their region that provides for triage, treatment and initial
stabilization to care for patients affected in mass numbers. . . [and]
conduct[ing] drills to test those plans," and participating "in
community-based training and education sessions."10 9 It is unfortunate
that an update on the Illinois health care system's progress towards
meeting these requirements is not addressed and developed within the
Illinois plan.
Though different in content and scope, three themes are central
to both the federal and Illinois plans: preparedness and communication;
surveillance and detection; and response and containment. 10 The
following is a very brief overview of how these themes materialize in
104 See id.
105 See IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 23-30.
106 Press Release, Ill. Dep't. of Pub. Health, Gov. Blagojevich Announces Grants for
Communities to Better Prepare for a Major Emergency or Bioterrorist Attack
[hereinafter "Gov. Announces"], available at
http://www.idph.state.il.us/public/press05/12.30.05.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
107 Id.
108 A POD is the hospital designated to take the lead in healthcare during a disaster.
Gov. Announces, supra note 106.
109 Gov. Announces, supra note 106.
110 See National Strategy, supra note 15; IDPH plan, supra note 103.
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both plans, including an analysis of each plan's deficiencies in light of
lessons learned through other public health emergencies.
A. Preparedness and Communication
1. Federal Plan
In terms of preparedness and communication, the federal plan focuses
on ramping up vaccine manufacturing capabilities and establishing
communication strategies. Prior to a pandemic outbreak, the federal
plan calls for the creation of a national stockpile of flu vaccine and an
increase in domestic flu vaccine manufacturing capacity.",
Additionally, the government must assess the state and local vaccine
distribution plans to ensure they are easily implemented and practiced.
Moreover, the government must gather the people, equipment, and
facilities to monitor vaccine coverage, adverse events, and
effectiveness and guarantee the availability of approved antiviraldrugs 112 The federal plan also delegates an extensive list of flu
preparedness activities to hospitals, such as establishing "new systems
for communication between hospitals and the CDC" and creating
"mechanisms by which competitive hospitals can 'share' their staff."" 3
Once a pandemic virus strain emerges in the population, the
federal government is to manufacture, test, license, and produce a
vaccine effective against the specific strain. 114 Additionally, it must
coordinate allocation and administration of the vaccine to pre-defined
priority groups and ensure protection for scarce vaccine dosages.' 15
Preceding a pandemic outbreak, the federal government must
develop and test communication materials to provide the public with
both easy-to-understand information regarding pandemic influenza and
information regarding the procedures through which authorities within
each community will update the public during a pandemic. 116 At the
pandemic's onset, the federal government must be ready to provide
public education and information to communicate measures the public
can implement to minimize risk and decrease the spread of infection.
The government must also be prepared to provide honest, accurate,
" 1 HHS Plan, supra note 15, at 24.
112 Id.
113 UPMC, supra note 31, at 2.
14 HHS Plan, supra note 15, at 24.
115 HHS Plan, supra note 15, at 24.
116 Id.
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understandable, and timely information and have the ability to counter
confusion and panic."l
7
2. Illinois Plan
According to the current Illinois plan, the Office of the Governor will
take the lead in all aspects regarding the development of a pandemic
communication strategy and the IDPH will implement training
exercises to ensure the strategy is effective." 8
The Illinois plan aims to provide the needed pandemic
information to the public and key partners as part of a "well-
coordinated and consistent communication strategy."" 9  This
communication strategy includes creating a plan for emergency risk
communication to "educate the media, public, partners and
stakeholders" regarding relevant risks and appropriate responses;
training and conducting drills to assess "communications capacity,
needs and readiness"; and completing a plan to address the specific
needs of special populations such as the disabled, mentally ill, non-
English speaking, homeless, and elderly. 120
The Governor's office will be responsible for alerting and
informing the public about pandemic influenza via state and local web
sites, providing educational material about self-care, prevention and
psychological well-being during a pandemic, identifying and training
''government spokespersons on public health crisis response and risk
communication principles to effectively communicate helpful,
informative messages in a timely manner during a pandemic influenza
outbreak," and developing and implementing both informational and
rumor control hotlines with the capacity to handle peak call volume as
recommended by the CDC. 121
In terms of preparing vaccine priorities, Illinois will follow the
vaccine priority group guidelines as set by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. 122A "support annex" lists the preparation
activities that should be addressed by hospitals in Illinois, however, as
previously mentioned, adequate funding has not yet been provided and
117 HHS Plan, supra note 15, at 25.
118 See generally IDPH plan, supra note 103.
"9 Id. at 73.
120 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 73.
121 Id.
12 Id. at 56-57.
[VOL.lO0.2:213
PANDEMIC A VIAN INFLUENZA
proposed activities are presented as suggestions rather than
requirements. 1
23
3. Analysis
As the lack of leadership and confusion of authority during Hurricane
Katrina response efforts has demonstrated, the federal government must
name a knowledgeable person to assume control over the pandemic
preparedness and response programs. 124  In her February 8, 2006
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology, Dr. Tara O'Toole, Director and CEO of the
UPMC, reported that because "federal agencies do not now include the
full range and depth of talent and experience required to develop and
implement a pandemic flu plan," there is a need to assemble a sizable
staff of "senior professionals and executives" who could implement the
pandemic response efforts.
125
The federal plan falls short on its lofty preparedness provisions.
While the federal government has claimed responsibility for creating a
stockpile of vaccines and antivirals, the federal plan is silent on the
construction of a specific nationalized process for the allocation or
distribution of either vaccines or antivirals.' 26  Moreover, the plan
instructs states to devise their own distribution systems for the vaccines
and antiviral medications, even though distribution systems have long
been "recognized as a missing vital ingredient in state bioterrorism
preparedness. ' 27 If FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina is any
indication of the government's distribution capabilities, America is in
dire straits. As distribution was arguably FEMA's greatest limitation in
its hurricane response efforts, the government simply cannot leave the
creation of distribution plans for life-saving vaccines to be determined
by the individual states at a later time. This weakness in the
123 Id. at 91.
124 See Protecting the Homeland: Fighting Pandemic Flu From the Front Lines
February 8, 2006: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Homeland Sec., (Testimony of
Tara O'Toole, MD, MPH) [hereinafter "O'Toole Testimony"], U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, available at
http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyOToole.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006)
125 O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 7.
126 UPMC, supra note 31, at 2.
127 UPMC, supra note 31, at 2.
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distribution process must be remedied by concrete plans standardizing a
regional distribution scheme.
Furthermore, despite the federal government's suggestion that
hospitals undertake preparedness activities, the money earmarked for
such endeavors is grossly insufficient.'28 Until the federal government
identifies ways to compensate hospitals for their efforts, the plan's
critics find it "highly unlikely that any hospital will act on the [federal]
Plan's recommendations."'
129
At the state level, the original Illinois plan was relatively bare-
boned, had sizeable gaps in its communication strategy, and left
vaccine priorities to be determined after a pandemic was declared.
Fortunately, the updated Illinois plan provides far greater detail
regarding both the roles and procedures that will be implemented by the
state to ensure optimal preparedness.
The Illinois plan delegates the creation of a communications
strategy to the Office of the Governor, but the actual strategy does not
yet exist. 130  Significantly, following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the
victims complained about "confusing and inadequate" communication
by health officials. 131 This inadequacy should indicate the importance
of providing "direct, consistent and accurate information" in the event
of a pandemic. 132 Similarly, throughout Hurricane Katrina there were
devastating disconnects in communication between federal, state, and
local authorities that led to slow and disorderly rescue efforts; the
failure of some to evacuate the area; and problems with obtaining
necessary supplies.'1 33 While the content of the communication strategy
may not be prepared in advance, the communication structure should be
developed and practiced before the stress of a public health emergency
is underway. Lists of pertinent contacts could likely be generated
effortlessly and thoroughly with the benefit of time. Websites could be
established and advertised well in advance to assure the public it will
be informed of developments. In addition, as Dr. Perl suggested after
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 7-8.
13 Keller, supra note 79.
132 Id.
133 See CNN.com, Brown Says He's Been Made Katrina Scapegoat, Feb. 10, 2006, at
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/10/katrina.brown/index.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2006). See also Jeanne Meserve, E-mails show FEMA Infighting,
Frustration, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/18/fema.memos/index.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006).
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her experience assisting the Canadian public health system during the
SARS outbreak, states should assign "an experienced doctor who
understands the daily workings of hospitals" to lead the public
communication efforts in communities. 134 Not only should this provide
the public with comfort due to familiarity, but it would also enhance the
credibility of information dispensed.
On a positive note, Illinois has a fully functional vaccine
distribution plan that was established and tested as part of the IDPH's
Y2K contingency plans. 35  This plan accounts for distribution,
inventory, security, excess storage space, "cold chain" maintenance,
and controlling vaccine losses through expiration dates, among other
important concerns. 1
36
B. Surveillance and Detection
1. Federal Plan
Duties retained by the federal government with regard to surveillance
activities include increasing international surveillance, collaborating
with the World Health Organization ("WHO") to track worldwide
outbreaks, developing containment activities, obtaining samples of
virus to be used in vaccine production, implementing control measures
(e.g., quarantines and isolation of cases) at points-of-entry to the U.S.,
conducting studies on adverse vaccine reactions, and implementing
public health measures to limit the spread of infection.' 
37
2. Illinois Plan
In Illinois, the IDPH will be responsible for activating sentinel
surveillance doctors to observe and alert the CDC regarding whether
the virus has spread throughout Illinois. 138 The IDPH is to coordinate
ongoing studies with the local health departments and the CDC
regarding hospital case load, efficacy of the vaccination, unusual
pathologic features linked to fatalities, and the success of containment
134 See Altman, supra note 66.
135 Vaccine Delivery/Antiviral Usage Annex, IDPH Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
and Response Plan, (Revised 2004 version) (on file with author).
136 id.
137 See HHS plan, supra note 14, at 23-25 (The full text of federal responsibilities
under the HHS's plan can be found in Table 2: Key Pandemic Response Elements and
Key Capabilities for their Effective Implementation).
138 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 43.
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measures, among other things.139Regarding surveillance, the Illinois
plan states:
Public Health Surveillance is the on-going systematic
collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of
health data essential to the planning, implementation, and
evaluation of public health practice. . .Syndrome
surveillance is an investigational approach to surveillance
typically using electronic databases, which may assist in
both early identification of an outbreak, and defining the
size and scope of a recognized health event... The Illinois
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (INEDSS)
is part of a national electronic disease reporting system that
not only links health providers and state and local public
health agencies within Illinois, but also provides data to the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 140
The INEDSS system will eventually be fully implemented in
Illinois for "hospitals, doctors and other health care providers to
electronically report infectious diseases to the state and local health
departments." 1 4 1 The IDPH will develop the reporting of relevant data
to monitor "influenza and its complications. according to guidance
from the CDC."'
142
3. Analysis
The federal government has been criticized for failing to adequately
finance key elements of its surveillance and containment efforts, such
as surveillance and containment in Asia. 143 Additionally, the federal
plan implies that a flu pandemic could be stopped in Asia if the virus is
detected speedily. 144 This is already impossible because H5N1 avian
flu is currently endemic in Asian poultry and the virus has already
spread to Africa and Europe. 145 Thus, presenting these suggestions
139 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 44.
140 Id. at 52.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 UPMC, supra note 31, at 1.
144 HHS plan, supra note 15, at 17.
145 Bradsher, supra note 37.
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may "create false expectations" about the federal lovernment's
proposed disease surveillance and containment measures.
For its part, like most states, the Illinois plan relies on sentinel
doctors throughout the state to determine when the virus has emerged
in Illinois. Only about twenty-five percent of the states, however,
anticipate or currently utilize "real-time syndromic surveillance of
influenzalike illness (ILl) in persons seeking care at clinics or hospital
emergency departments to detect the onset of pandemic influenza."'
147
Illinois is one of the states anticipating syndromic surveillance.' 48 The
implementation of a syndromic surveillance system within Illinois will
facilitate the flow of disease-related data within Illinois and nationwide
and is central to effective surveillance and detection of pandemic flu.
Other states should follow suit to ensure the rapid detection of
pandemic flu.
C. Response and Containment
1. Federal Plan
As part of the federal government's response and containment efforts,
the federal plan instructs the federal government to ensure that
equipment and supplies maintained by the Strategic National Stockpile
and state stockpiles are sufficient to enhance hospital surge capacity.
The federal government must also make available accurate rapid
diagnostic methods to detect and characterize flu viruses and develop
workforce resiliency programs. 149 After a pandemic is declared, the
federal government must oversee the distribution of stockpiled
ventilators and medical supplies to hospitals and agencies, deploy
federal Medical Stations to provide health care surge capacity as
needed, assist communities with surge mortuary services to
accommodate a large number of expected fatalities, and provide
psychosocial support to responders. 150
146 UPMC, supra note 31, at 3.
147 Scott D. Holmberg et. al., State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza, 12
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1414-1417, 1415 (2006).
148 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 52.
149 HHS plan, supra note 15, at 25.
150 HHS plan, supra note 15, at 25.
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2. Illinois Plan
Vaccine remains the primary response mechanism for preventing
influenza-related illness and fatalities.' 51 Once the vaccine becomes
available, the IDPH must ensure that manpower and logistics are in
place to activate the vaccine and drug distribution. 152 The plan states
that vaccine will be administered to persons in priority groups, in
accordance with existing recommendations as listed in the HHS
Pandemic Influenza Plan. 153  During a pandemic, the precise
composition of the priority groups may change in order to preserve
societal functions. 54  Furthermore, the plan instructs that priority
groups should be re-evaluated during the pandemic as "information is
obtained regarding the epidemiology of the virus and vaccine
effectiveness."' 155 Later in the pandemic, the full at-risk population will
be vaccinated. 1
56
In terms of communication during the response period, the
Governor's Office will filter information from all state agencies,
conduct media briefings, make experts (e.g., the Director of Public
Health, the IDPH Infectious Diseases physician, the IDPH State
Epidemiologist, etc.) available to the media, and "oversee the issuance
of news releases."' 57 IEMA staff will ensure the news releases are
shared with the other state organizations and agencies and with the
county and local health departments. 58 The state will also distribute
"timely, accurate, and consistent information to local health
departments and health care providers on treatment and care of patients,
vaccine prioritization and use, use of antiviral medications, infection
control practices, isolation and quarantine procedures, clinical and
laboratory diagnostics, travel control authority, [and] stigmatization
management," as well as information regarding "legal issues related to
the pandemic."' 159
In the event that a pandemic results in mass casualties, the
Illinois plan outlines IEMA's responsibilities in implementing the
151 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 54.
152 id.
153 id.
154 Id.
155 id.
156 id.
117 Id. at 74.
158 Id.
159 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 74.
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existing mass fatality plan for the collection, identification, storage, and
disposal of dead bodies. 160
Recovery efforts will primarily be coordinated by IEMA and
will involve helping "individuals, communities, and commercial
enterprises return to pre-pandemic conditions as quickly and painlessly
as possible. State and federal statues govern many aspects of the
recovery phase."161
3. Analysis
The federal plan's response and containment initiatives may be best
evaluated by examining what is absent from the plan. The federal plan
does not specify that the federal government will "coordinate or
intervene in the delivery of medical services during a pandemic."
'1 62
The access-to-care problems and inefficiencies that already beleaguer
the American health care system will create unique challenges during a
pandemic, at a time when the demand for medical services will far
exceed the supply.' 63  The federal government has delegated this
problem "to the private sector and to any governors or mayors brave
enough to tackle these immense and entrenched problems."'' 64  In
addition, there is no mention in the federal plan of the intent to
financially support the hospitals providing care to the millions of ill
people, even though the federal government's planning assumptions
state unequivocally that millions of Americans will seek care. This is
an unfortunate oversight as hospitals will have no way to finance their
battles against a pandemic once their elective treatments, or income
sources, are eliminated.
In terms of local response, because "current HHS Guidance is
not clear regarding purchasing, stockpiling, and distribution
expectations for the public and private sectors," the development of
definitive state response plans is hindered. 65 As the quantities of
vaccine and antiviral medication that will be allotted to Illinois remain
uncertain, it may therefore be prudent for Illinois to add antiviral assets
to the Illinois Strategic Stockpile, which the plan does suggest. 1
66
160 Id. at 78-85.
161 Id. at 8.
162 UPMC, supra note 31, at 2.
163 id.
164 Id.
165 IDPH plan, supra note 103, at 54.
166 Id. at 55.
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From a communication standpoint, Illinois' plan to coordinate
the release of information to "health care providers, contiguous states,
volunteer agencies providing disaster relief, the federal government,
and affected local governments" will be essential in order to gain the
public's confidence. 167  This plan, however, must provide specific
guidance and must be tested and practiced prior to a pandemic to
ensure that it is effective.
Unfortunately, like most states, the Illinois plan does not devote
coverage to early containment responses that emphasize practical
"personal avoidance steps," such as working from home and keeping
sick children from going to school. 168 In this computer-based society,
working from home may provide an easily-implemented and effective
form of social distancing to prevent the spread of the flu. 169 The
Illinois plan also fails to encourage other straightforward containment
recommendations, "such as avoiding mass gatherings; shopping on off
hours; and household and workplace strategies such as frequent hand
washing, avoiding handshaking, and keeping towels separate." 170
Instead, the Illinois plan encourages the evaluation of those options
after the pandemic's arrival.
IV. THE FORGOTTEN FRONT LINE: CRITICAL CONCERNS
FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The one seemingly forgotten aspect of both federal and state influenza
pandemic preparedness plans may be the most important feature: the
health care system. The 1918 influenza pandemic killed between thirty
and fifty million victims worldwide without any interventions.'
71
Scientists and physicians at the time were not aware they were looking
for a virus. 172 Today, scientists know which viruses they are handlingand have the ability to create vaccines and antiviral medications that
167 Id. at 74.
168 Holmberg, supra note 147, at 1416.
169 See Holmberg, supra note 147, at 1416 (suggesting working from home to prevent
spread of flu).
170 Id. at 1417.
171 Grady, supra note 18.
172 See Crosby, supra note 2 ("Science knew next to nothing about viruses at this
time. The optical microscopes they had couldn't show you a virus, virus is much too
small for them. Nobody would ever see virus until the electron microscope came
along and that was decades after that. These poor scientists were looking for a needle
in a haystack, when they didn't know it was a needle they were looking for and the
needle was too small for them to see. No wonder they didn't find it").
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may lessen the pandemic's impact. Governments have begun to create
and implement preparedness plans for viral attacks. Why, in a country
with pandemic preparedness plans and advanced medical knowledge, is
the health care system still so unprepared?
Public health officials and practitioners alike believe that
America's main line of defense against pandemics, the health care
system, is incredibly vulnerable. In her February 8, 2006 testimony,
Dr. O'Toole urged Congress that much remains to be done as
"hospitals are among the most fragile components of mass casualty
response."' 73 In support of this contention, Dr. O'Toole elaborated by
saying that "hospitals have little money of their own to spend on
stockpiling supplies or planning for catastrophes." 174  O'Toole also
noted that "[t]he US health care sector is highly fragmented,
competitive and largely private," 175 and that "[o]ne third of US
hospitals [already] do not meet operating costs.' 176
In the worst case scenario, following the declaration of a
pandemic, no vaccine will be ready for the first seven to eight months.
Furthermore, the nation's entire supply of ventilators will be in use'
77
and emergency rooms will overflow with gravely ill patients. These
limitations have not been remedied by either the federal or the Illinois
plan. Ironically, none of the state pandemic plans that exist nationwide
discuss helping health care providers make the tough ethical decisions
173 O 'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 3.
114 Id. "Hospitals do not have the funds to pay for pandemic preparedness planning or
to purchase stockpiles of equipment or train staff. Federal funds for hospital
preparedness began only in FY 2002 and have remained at low levels. The federal
appropriation for FY 2006 was only enough to cover the salary of a single nurse at
each of the country's approximately 5000 hospitals for one year." Id. at 3.
115 Id. at 4.
176 Id. at 3. "Among non-profit hospitals which are in the black, operating margins
average only 3%. In a pandemic, hospitals would be forced to close clinics, cancel
surgery and defer most money making services to care for the volume of flu victims.
Many hospitals may be forced to close down due to lack of staff and/or lack of
revenue." Id.
177 Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
July/Aug. 2005, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84402-
p30/michael-t-osterholm/preparing-for-the-next-pandemic.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2006). "Aside from medication, many countries would not have the ability to meet
the surge in the demand for health-care supplies and services that are normally taken
for granted. In the United States, for example, there are 105,000 mechanical
ventilators, 75,000 to 80,000 of which are in use at any given time for everyday
medical care. During a routine influenza season, the number of ventilators being used
shoots up to 100,000. In an influenza pandemic, the United States may need as many
as several hundred thousand additional ventilators." Id.
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that will confront everyone in a pandemic, such as "should an elderly
patient be taken off the ventilator to provide a ventilator to a fifteen-
year-old child in respiratory distress?" and "is it more of a priority to
provide vaccines to children or adults?"' 178 An effective preparedness
plan requires Congress to "appropriate sufficient funds, on an ongoing
basis, to allow hospitals to execute specific, clearly identified and
measurable preparedness activities."'1 79 Accordingly, four aspects of
the health care system must be examined by the federal and state
governments, local health departments, and hospitals with an eye
toward improvement: supplementing the health care workforce on short
notice, increasing and monitoring medical supply levels, securing
funding for health care initiatives, and generating public awareness of
impending ethical decisions.
A. Supplementing Workforce Plans
One thing is certain, in the event of a pandemic, hospitals will be filled
to capacity and unable to treat all who seek care; what is less clear is
why the federal and state governments have not made increasing
hospitals' surge capacity a priority. Predictions published by the CDC
suggest that "a 'medium-level' pandemic [without drugs or vaccines]
could cause... 314,000 to 734,000 hospitalizations [and result in] 18 to
24 million outpatient visits..." 80 The U.S. Census Bureau reports that
approximately 7,500 hospitals nationwide employ nearly 5.1 million
people; the current supply of medical staff is hardly sufficient to
provide for the projected hospitalizations and outpatient visits. 181
178 Helen Branswell, Public Debate Needed on Pandemic Ethics, CNEWs Canada,
Nov. 27, 2005, at http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2005/11/27/1326646-
cp.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
179 O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 8. "[Congress] should charge HHS with
responsibility for designing processes, possibly in collaboration with the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, for ensuring that these
activities are implemented and adequate." Id.
180 Centers for Disease Control, Pandemic Flu: Key Facts, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/keyfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
181 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Facts For Features, April 29, 2005, available
at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/facts for features-special-editions/004491.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2006). See also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., States and Cities Lag in Bird
Flu Readiness [hereinafter "States Lag"], N.Y. Times.com, Feb. 6, 2006, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/politics/O6flu.html ?ex= 1141016400&en=2c79ae
ebed2c0c32&ei=5070 (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) ("Dr. Roger P. Baxter, head of flu
preparedness for Kaiser Permanente, said his Northern California hospital network
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Additionally, as the first responders, the health care workforce
will be the most vulnerable population in the event of a flu pandemic.
Those infected with the H5N1 virus, or the flu in general, are
contagious before they even know it.182 Thus, patients will arrive at the
hospital with symptoms of a bad cold, pneumonia, or seasonal
influenza, and, without a prior vaccination, health care workers will be
exposed. Health care workers will also lead the vaccination campaigns,
again putting themselves at risk of exposure. Furthermore, throughout
the pandemic, health care workers will be highly susceptible to illness
due to their constant and close exposure to the mass amounts of ill
patients.
The unfortunate reality of these hypothetical scenarios is that
among the sick will be some of the country's medical staff. Hospitals
will have to contend with a staff that is ill, dead, or too scared to come
into work for fear of putting themselves or their families at risk. "' The
staff that does show up for work will soon become overworked and
exhausted and might not be allowed to return to their families in order
to contain the disease.
Four actions should be implemented by health departments
nationwide to protect and supplement this workforce. First, state
licensing boards should mandate provisions to ensure that physicians
and support staff may be credentialed at various hospitals in a region
prior to an emergency, and licensing boards should also determine how
to temporarily extend licenses to retirees. 184 Supplemental plans may
include enlisting the help of retired physicians or nurses, volunteers, or
non-credentialed health care workers from another state. 185 To rally
support in communities and engage the public in supplementing the
health care workforce, state and local governments should educate the
public about the seriousness of a pandemic emergency and the need for
the public's participation in response efforts.
186
Second, local health departments must work alongside hospitals
in their regions to create databases of health care workers and support
was 'probably better off than 90 percent of the health systems out there, and we have
no surge capacity. We're a business, and we operate on a thin margin,' Dr. Baxter
said. 'We don't have extra ventilators. Even in normal flu seasons,' he added, 'we
tend to divert patients to other hospitals. There's no way we can realistically plan for
this'").
182 CDC, supra note 12.
183 Osterholm, supra note 177. O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 3.
184 O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 5.
185 Id.
186 See id. at 8.
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staff so that they may be quickly accessed during a public health
emergency. Hospitals must be able to quickly identify and contact
physicians and support staff to coordinate an effective response
effort.187 Aside from New York City, Minneapolis, and Seattle, these
plans do not generally exist.' 88 Illinois Governor Blagojevich signed a
bill into law in July 2005 that requires the IDPH to create a database
containing contact information for "all licensed medical professionals
in the state," as well as "all active-status health care professionals who
could be contacted to volunteer their medical skills during
emergencies. '' 89 Generally, however, public health agencies have not
undertaken this endeavor due to the lack of funding and lack of "legal
power to direct, manage or coordinate hospitals in crisis."1 90 Still, there
is an "urgent need to create regional databases of health care workers
that would allow rapid identification of and contact with professionals"
of specified credentials and skills. 191
Third, states must ensure that health care workers have adequate
liability protection wherever they might need to practice."' While the
standard of care will likely decrease in the event of a pandemic,
physicians will make tough decisions and people will die. In today's
litigious society, it is more than likely there will be lawsuits in the
pandemic's aftermath.
Finally, hospitals must consider in advance how to keep the
staff separate from the sick, which may involve instituting a quarantine
of the staff and preventing staff from returning to their families or
venturing outside. For example, when SARS appeared in Toronto,
health care workers were merely able to travel from their respective
homes to the hospital and back. 193 Hospitals even set up grocery stores
in their cafeterias so health care workers could purchase their food
without interacting with the public. 1
94
B. Stockpiling Medical Supplies
In the event of a pandemic, experts agree the demand for supplies will
greatly outpace production, which may come to a grinding halt all over
187 O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 5.
188 Id.
189 Gov. Announces, supra note 106.
190 O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 5.
191 Id.
192 id.
193 Altman, supra note 66.
194 id.
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the world and result in a deadly shortage of necessary supplies. As
noted by Dr. Osterholm,
Today we have a just-in-time delivery system for masks,
syringes, for IV bags [and] the two manufacturers of N95
masks in this country are operating on 100% capacity.
They have no surge capacity. We will run out quickly of
all these things. And at that time, we'll be dealing with the
equivalent of a 1918 health care system.1
95
An article in the Wall Street Journal stated the above premise
eloquently, "The very rules of capitalism that make the U.S. an ultra-
efficient marketplace also make it exceptionally vulnerable in a
pandemic.' 196  This just-in-time mentality is fundamentally at odds
with the necessary mentality for preparedness: stockpile, stockpile,
stockpile. 197 Examples of critical supply shortages abound from the
Canadian SARS experience. The Canadian health system was
surprised by their suppliers' refusal to deliver medical supplies to
hospitals dealing with SARS patients for fear of contracting the
illness. 98 Canadian nursing unions were outraged when vital N95
masks were diverted to Asian countries that were hardest hit by SARS,
which forced Canadian nurses to use less effective masks and recycle
used masks from earlier shifts. 199 In response to this inevitability,
hospitals must review their supplier contracts to be sure they will be
enforceable in a medical emergency and stockpile the necessary
supplies in advance. As states may depend on hospitals to provide
ancillary supplies, such as syringes or gauze, in the event of a mass
vaccination effort, plans must consider additional financing to ensure
195 Anita Manning, States Must Create Flu Plans: Pandemic Readiness is All Local,
USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2006, at 8D, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-02-01-flu-meetingx.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2006).
196 Bernard Wysocki Jr. and Sarah Lueck, Just-In-Time Inventories Make U.S.
Vulnerable in a Pandemic, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06012/636982.stm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006)
("Near-empty warehouses are a sign of strong inventory management. Production of
drugs takes place offshore because that's cheaper. The federal government doesn't
intervene as a guaranteed buyer of flu drugs, as it does with weapons. Investors and
tax rules conspire to eliminate redundancy and reserves. Antitrust rules prevent
private companies from collaborating to speed development of new drugs").
197 See id.
'98 Choo, supra note 6, at 39.
'99 Wysocki and Lueck, supra note 196.
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hospitals have sufficient quantities of the necessary supplies to
effectuate these plans.
C. Securing Federal Funding
The lack of funding for hospital response efforts is of heightened
consequence during a pandemic emergency because hospitals'
traditional sources of income will be non-existent or quickly depleted.
While the federal government has earmarked billions of dollars for
vaccine and drug research, it has only allotted $350 million to local
20health departments. 2° After the $350 million is divided among the five
thousand existing health departments, each will only receive
approximately $70,000, an astonishingly low amount of funding. 20 1 A
concerned citizen has pointed out that in communities with a
population greater than seventy thousand, a one dollar donation from
each resident would equal or surpass what the government has provided
in funding the local health care systems.20 2
Several forces will ultimately coalesce to exacerbate the funding
crunch during a pandemic, including excess demand for care,
cancellation of elective surgeries, and the requirements of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA").
EMTALA is a federal statute that was enacted to prevent "patient
dumping" and requires that hospitals provide a medical screening for
any patient who comes to the emergency room with an emergency
condition.20 3 If a patient comes to a hospital with an emergency
medical condition, and an H5N1 infection would qualify as an
emergency medical condition, the hospital must stabilize that patient
without consideration of whether the patient has the means to pay for
204the services. As a result, the hordes of infected people that could
potentially show up on the hospitals' respective doorsteps will need to
be treated. In actuality there is no way to ensure that every patient
seeking care in a pandemic emergency will get it, and the EMTALA
requirements may need to be relaxed in the event of a pandemic.
200 States Lag, supra note 181.
201 Id.
202 Creative Funding For Local Flu Pandemic Preparedness - Part 2, Pandemic Plan
Blogspot, Feb. 6, 2006, at
http://reports.typepad.com/pandemic-plan/2006/02/creativefundin_ .html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006).
203 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd
(2003).204 id.
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The excess demand for care is an obvious effect of a pandemic,
but the cancellation of elective surgeries is just as imminent.20 5
Hospitals will likely delay elective surgeries, as was the case during the
Canadian response to SARS, in order to limit exposure to the virus.
Elective surgery is a typical profit center at any hospital, and when that
source is severed, hospitals will suffer greatly. Even so, a third of all
hospitals in Illinois are already losing money on overall operations, and
some of these hospitals currently operate on deficits. 20 6  The
cancellation of elective surgeries in addition to the care required by
EMTALA may push hospitals nationwide over the financial edge in
minimal time.
With meager federal funding, no steady source of income, and
the responsibility of financing the care of the masses, hospitals truly
have a challenging and unenviable role in the response efforts. To
close these gaps, Congress must appropriate adequate funds to enable
hospitals to meet the responsibilities that have been delegated to
them. 2
7
Another act that Congress should contemplate is the possibility
of enforcing "eminent domain" over private hospitals in a public health
crisis. 2°8 This would allow the government to take control of privately-
owned hospitals to ensure that hospitals stay afloat and provide non-
discriminatory care during the financial turmoil that may exist.
205 See Nancy Shute, SARS Hits Home, USNews.com, May 5, 2003, at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/030505/5sars.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2006) (discussing how SARS required hospitals to cancel elective surgeries such
as heart surgery). See also Mary Ann Childers, Cost High To Ready Hospitals For
Flu Pandemic, CBS Broadcasting, Nov. 1, 2005, available at
http://cbs2chicago.com/topstories/local-story-305173040.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2006) (Dr. Dino Rumoro, an emergency medicine expert at Rush University Medical
Center says that one of the keys to containment may be to cancel elective surgery).
206 Press Release, 11. Hosp. Ass'n, Hospital Leaders Urge General Assembly to
Reject Damaging Proposals on Charity Care and Billing (Feb. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.ihatoday.org/issues/payment/charity/pressconfrelease.pdf (last visited
Feb. 26, 2006).
207 O'Toole Testimony, supra note 124, at 8.
208 id.
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D. Generating Public Awareness of Ethical Decisions
A substantial oversight afflicting the existing preparedness plans is the
failure to address the issue of helping health care workers make ethical
life and death decisions that the general public will find acceptable.
The public must be informed that the medical sector will be making
medical judgments concerning the rationing of medical care, supplies,
and equipment. It will be difficult for the public to access the health
care system, and hospitals may refuse to perform elective surgeries in
this environment. A Canadian article discussing pandemic
preparedness emphasizes that "[health care workers] shudder at the
thought of having to decide what to do when they've run out of life-
saving mechanical ventilators and a gravely ill 15-year-old comes
through the emergency department door. . . [d]o they take the oldest
person on a ventilator in the hospital off it?
20 9
Several experts maintain this very decision could indeed become
a common occurrence if H5Nl turns into a pandemic. 2  Dr. Allison
McGeer, head of infection control at Toronto's Mount Sinai Hospital,
has said it is hard to have these discussions without frightening
211people. Yet the responsibility remains to have these deliberations
regarding what will be ethically acceptable before the crowded
emergency rooms become a reality. Dr. Peter Singer, Director of the
University of Toronto's Joint Centre for Bioethics, maintains, "the
ethical issues are ... going to be the glue that holds a society together
when it's struggling through a very, very tough time...,,
21 2
Some experts have also suggested that "ad hoc prioritization" of
vaccines and antivirals will create dissent, unrest, and disruption among
the American public.21 3 While a genuine consensus of the American
public regarding ventilator, vaccine, or antiviral rationing may be
impossible due to extreme variations in political, religious, and moral
beliefs, there can be no harm in starting the discussion and building
209 Branswell, supra note 178.
210 Id. See also The Oprah Winfrey Show: Bird Flu: The Untold Story (Harpo Studios
television broadcast Jan. 24, 2006) (Dr. Michael T. Osterholm was the guest and
discussed how older, irreversibly ill people may be removed from the limited
ventilators to care for younger people suffering from H5N1 infections).
211 Branswell, supra note 178.
212 Id.
213 Osterholm, supra note 177. For example, to prevent the unrest, Canadian public
health officials intend to present Canadian prioritization plans to the public in order to
generate debate and hopefully arrive at a mutually acceptable arrangement before a
pandemic. Id See also Branswell, supra note 178.
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awareness of pandemic realities. Local health departments can initiate
committees comprised of state officials, medical staff members, and
city council members, or the general public. The more the public is
included in these conversations, the less opposition critical decision-
makers will face when it comes time to make the tough ethical calls.
Canadian health care workers that are currently practicing this
community involvement agree,
[these] discussions. . .won't make the news any less
devastating at the individual level if, during a pandemic, a
doctor informs a person his mother can't be put on a
ventilator because someone else needs it more. . .'But
people [might] recognize that some of those really tough
choices that we will be faced with are perhaps unfortunate,
but not unfair.'
214
Furthermore, the standard of care will likely be significantly less
exacting during a pandemic; now is the time to determine and specify
the standard of care owed by physicians and medical staff in this
situation. As shown in the Canadian SARS outbreak, some health care
workers will not show up for work and others will flatly refuse to see
patients infected with H5N1, an understandable and human response.
The government and licensing boards must discuss and plan for these
outcomes. Besides guaranteeing that health care workers will receive
the first rounds of priority vaccinations, the government should, at the
very least, offer incentives such as disability insurance, bonuses, and
death benefits to encourage health care workers to participate in
response efforts. But it would be wise for the licensing boards also to
evaluate the possibility of enacting license restrictions after a pandemic
for those who refuse to serve in the response efforts. This may
stimulate and encourage a robust workforce in an emergency situation.
V. CONCLUSION
While the world has had ample opportunity to prepare for a pandemic,
many obvious gaps in American preparedness exist and the most
important ones plague the health care system. The federal and Illinois
pandemic preparedness plans were well-intended documents that may
be greatly improved by an increased specificity and standardization. In
214 Branswell, supra note 178.
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order to improve the federal plan, the federal government must clearly
identify and delegate which actions must be completed by state and
local governments, hospitals, and public health departments. The
Illinois plan would benefit from additional direction regarding practical
containment and social distancing practices. In addition, Congress
must appropriate sufficient funds to support the preparedness efforts on
all levels. While the health care system may currently be America's
weakest link, it must become the nation's strongest asset. Federal and
state actions, such as creating supplemental workforce plans,
stockpiling medical supplies, securing federal funding, and generating
public awareness, may mean the difference between a functioning
health care system and one that is dead on a pandemic's arrival.
